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Abstract: Our primary aim in this paper is to sketch a cognitive evolutionary approach for 
developing explanations of social change that is anchored on the psychological mechanisms 
underlying normative cognition and the transmission of social norms. We throw the relevant 
features of this approach into relief by comparing it with the self-fulfilling social expectations 
account developed by Bicchieri and colleagues. After describing both accounts, we argue that 
the two approaches are largely compatible, but that the cognitive evolutionary approach is well-
suited to encompass much of the social expectations view, whose focus on a narrow range of 




While research on norms spans the humanities and human sciences, Christina 
Bicchieri’s social expectation account has recently risen to prominence in philosophy, and 
serves as a touchstone and focal point for much discussion.2 As such it will serve as our 
jumping off point and stalking horse in this paper. In the following section we will motivate 
and explain the core ideas of her account, and note some points of interest. Our discussion 
here will be brief, in part because Bicchieri’s view is well known, and in part because many of 
the other papers in this special issue also discuss it. Moreover, we go into more detail below, 
where relevant, when discussing those aspects of Bicchieri’s account that contrast with the 
cognitive evolutionary perspective we endorse. Our third (and largest) section will describe 
the view of norms that emerges from this perspective, focusing on its picture of humans’ 
distinctive normative psychology, and illustrating how a better understanding of the 
mechanisms underlying the acquisition, performance, and transmission of norms can help 
shed light on how norms influence behavior, and how they are susceptible to change. Our 
fourth and final section will compare and contrast Bicchieri’s view with our own. We argue 
that while her account usefully and accurately explains the phenomena on which it focuses, it 
is too restricted in scope to function as a complete theory of norms and norm psychology. 
However, we believe that much of her social expectation account is compatible with the 
broader scope of the cognitive evolutionary approach, and that together they each make 
important contributions to a complete theory of human normative psychology. 
 
II. Social Norms as Self-fulfilling Social Expectations 
 
In a number of papers and books, Christina Bicchieri has developed an impressive 
body of work on social norms.3 On Bicchieri’s picture, social norms are rules that govern the 
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behavior of individuals, in turn creating group-level regularities. Not all common behaviors, 
or group-level regularities, indicate the presence of a social norm, however, so the core idea 
of the theory is that a social norm is in place only if the relevant group-level regularity is 
sustained by a particular cluster of psychological states found within individual actors. The 
most important components of this complex are two types of social expectations, social 
because they are beliefs about other people. The first, which Bicchieri calls empirical 
expectations, are beliefs about how other people will act, specifically about how they are 
likely to behave in a particular type of situation. The second, which she calls normative 
expectations, are beliefs about how other people think one should act, specifically beliefs 
about what a person ought to do in a particular type of situation. These beliefs may often be 
accompanied by the belief that others will not just disapprove of, but actively sanction those 
who violate their normative expectations, punishing them for failing to act as they should (or 
that others will approve of and actively reward those who satisfy normative expectations). 
Importantly, then, this definition itself does not strictly imply the existence of social 
sanctions and rewards, although normative expectations often lead to sanctions and rewards, 
empirically. 
 
A third important component of Bicchieri’s social expectation theory speaks to the 
issue of motivation. Conditional conformity is another mark of social norms. On this view, 
in order for a group-level regularity to be properly explained as a social norm (rather than a 
moral norm, custom, practice, tradition, or any other group-level regularity), those engaged 
in the behavior must have a preference to follow the rule only if they believe those others will 
also follow the rule, and that those others believe that they ought to follow the rule—i.e., 
only if both kinds of social expectations are met. Bicchieri distinguishes social norms proper 
from what she calls descriptive norms, which are behavioral regularities marked by 
preferences conditional on empirical expectations, but not necessarily upon normative 
expectations; intuitively, a descriptive norm is one where people engage in a behavior 
because they believe everyone else engages in that behavior, even if no one believes people 
should engage in the behavior. Thus, the expectations and beliefs that underlie social norms 
and descriptive norms alike are social, and the preferences leading to conforming behavior 
are also social--i.e., dependent on how one expects others to behave. Patterns of behavior 
count as social norms only if they are brought about by a combination of beliefs about other 
people and motivations that depend upon other people. People prefer to comply with the 
social norm, but only on the condition that everyone else in the group is complying, and 
everyone else thinks it’s the right thing to do, too. 
 
When all of these conditions are met, a stable group-level regularity is sustained by 
the self-fulfilling interplay of the social expectations and social preferences of the individuals 
that make up the group, or network. Only group-level regularities thus stabilized, on 
Bicchieri’s view, are properly identified as social norms. In light of this set of individually 
necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, we’ll call the cluster of psychological states 
required for the presence of a social norm a Bicchieri-cluster, and the type of behavioral 
regularity it produces, which she simply calls a social norm, a Bicchieri-norm. 
 
A couple more comments will be useful here. First, though Bicchieri’s 2006 book is 
suggestively entitled The Grammar of Society: the Nature and Dynamics of Social Norms, its 
conceptual roots run through game theory and economics, and it draws on the resources of 
rational choice theory much more than linguistics (or cognitive science more broadly). 
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Indeed, while it rejects a purely behavioral or group-level definition of social norms, the 
types of psychological states at its core are essentially those of common belief/desire folk 
psychology, or the close counterparts (e.g. desires as preferences) typically represented in 
game theoretic models. That said, Bicchieri and her colleagues have recently developed the 
account in further detail, appealing to mental representations such as scripts and schemata,4 
social roles and positions in social networks, and traits of particular actors, such as perceived 
self-efficacy.5 Related to this, she also qualifies the definition of a social norm by appeal to 
the useful concept of a reference network, the group of people one takes into account in 
one’s social expectations and preferences, for any given norm. Finally, as she and her 
collaborators have emphasized recently, the self-fulfilling social expectations account has 
direct implications for crafting policies and other kinds of interventions designed to change 
these kinds of group level regularities. Bicchieri-norms are stabilized by expectations and 
preferences about what others are likely to do, and what they are likely to think. Thus, 
efforts at redirecting behavior governed by Bicchieri-norms are unlikely to succeed when 
they merely attempt to change personal preferences, or to correct false factual beliefs about 
health risks or other undesirable outcomes of the behavior in question. Rather, since a 
Bicchieri-norm is sustained by a Bicchieri-cluster, and the psychological states in a Bicchieri-
cluster are social and other-oriented, successful interventions need to focus on what the 
members in the reference network believe about what the other members in the reference network 
believe. 
 
III. A Cognitive Evolutionary Approach to Norms 
 
We will return to the Bicchieri view below, but will now set it aside in order to present a 
cognitive evolutionary approach. In this section we draw on a range recent work coming out 
of the cognitive sciences characterizing human capacities for cognizing and acquiring norms, 
and describe what are emerging as the key psychological properties of the mechanisms that 
underpin these capacities. Three points before we get started: First, while our account is 
informed by the insights and findings of a number of theorists, it is not identical to the view 
endorsed by any of them; our intent is to present a picture that represents the overlap and 
convergence of what we take to be the most promising work. For ease of exposition, we will 
refer to ours as the Minimal Account, which aims to capture what an emerging consensus 
sees as the core features of human norm psychology.6 Second, while we appeal to work often 
discussed under the heading of “empirical moral psychology,” the conception of normative 
psychology we work with is both broader and narrower that what might be considered the 
psychology of “morality”. On one hand, there is a great deal of work in moral psychology 
that we will not consider here, because it is nominally not about norms or normative 
cognition at all, but rather is about such issues as, for instance, the identification of 
intentional versus unintentional behavior, character trait-based versus situation-based 
explanations of behavior, conceptions of the true self, how to assign responsibility and 
blame for implicit bias, etc. On the other hand, the Minimal Account aspires to 
accommodate not just putatively moral norms, but also nonmoral norms of all kinds, 
including norms of logic, language, epistemology, aesthetics, religion, etiquette or any other 
kind.7 Finally, our characterization of the psychological underpinnings of normative behavior 
posited by the Minimal Account draws on a richer vocabulary than folk psychology provides, 
discussing mechanisms and subsystems sometimes in lieu of beliefs and desires (or belief-like 
and desire-like states such as expectations and preferences).8 While departure from 
commonsensical origins often accompanies a research program’s gains in conceptual 
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sophistication and explanatory power, we will address some particular implications of this 
fact when we compare the Minimal Account to the self-fulfilling social expectation view in 
section four.  
 
The Psychology of Normativity: A Minimal Account 
 
We begin with normativity in general. From a logical point of view, the defining feature 
of a normative proposition is that it says something about what is required, allowed, or 
forbidden. Normative statements either specify or imply what “should” or “shouldn’t” be 
done, expressing a rule or making some prescriptive claim about how people ought to think, 
feel, judge or behave. This feature provides a useful point of departure for making sense of 
the relationship between the logic of norms, on the one hand, and the psychology of norms, 
on the other. First, it allows us to distinguish normative from normal. A behavior does not 
count as norm-governed, and a pattern of behavior does not count as realizing a norm, 
simply in virtue of the fact that it happens to be normal, statistically speaking, within a 
population. Second, it allows us to distinguish good and bad from right and wrong. As Nichols 
(2004, chapter 1) points out, toothaches and natural disasters are bad, but they aren’t wrong; 
in such cases no rule has been violated or transgression committed. In contrast, if a person 
steals a few dollars from the tip jar at a coffee shop, or keeps showing up at dinner parties 
empty handed and without the requisite bottle of wine, they are not just acting badly, they 
are doing something they shouldn’t do. In both cases the person’s action breaks a rule, 
written or otherwise, and in virtue of this can properly be evaluated as wrong. Thus, in our 
sense, normative psychology is the psychology of oughts, and so part of the psychology of 
rules.9 
 
Consequently, it is also the psychology of compliance and enforcement. Indeed, from a 
psychological point of view, a distinctive, defining feature of norms concerns approval and 
disapproval, and the use of punishments and rewards to influence behavior. Again, a 
behavior is not normative in our sense merely in virtue of being typical. If reward and 
punishment play no role in explaining why a given pattern of behavior is statistically normal 
within a population, this suggests the regularity occurs for reasons other than the presence of 
a norm prescribing it, and perhaps that the individuals in the population themselves are 
indifferent to whether anyone actually engages in the behavior. This amounts to the claim 
that in such a case there is no sense, at least within the confines of causal, naturalistic 
explanation, in which anyone ought or ought not to engage in that behavior. In short, norms 
imply “oughts,” and “oughts” imply punishment and reward. 
 
Guided by similar assumptions, researchers like Richerson and Boyd, Chudek and 
Henrich, and Gelfand and Jackson summarize bodies of evidence supporting the existence 
of “a suite of genetically evolved cognitive mechanisms for rapidly perceiving local norms 
and internalizing them”.10 We refer to this complex of traits as the norm system, a more-or-less 
integrated, hierarchically organized collection of functional capacities and subsystems. This 
work suggests that some parts of the system are genetic adaptations that develop reliably 
across a wide range of different cultural environments, while others are highly local, typically 
acquired via imitation and social learning, but also sometimes through individual trial and 
error, and or the process of personal deliberation and reasoning. The combination of both 
innate (i.e., genetically inherited) structure and social learning allows our Minimal Account of 
the norm system to accommodate the fact that while norms in general are a ubiquitous part 
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of human social life in all cultures, the content of particular norms varies greatly from culture 
to culture, and changes over time within cultures. An appeal to genetic adaptation is able to 
explain why human individuals are universally capable of identifying, acquiring, and 
performing some set of norms or other, but it falters when it comes to explaining diversity 
and variation of norms across cultures; innate capacities for learning do not by themselves 
explain the particular content that an individual comes to learn, even if those learning 
mechanisms are themselves targeted at a specific and well delineated domain.11 In the same 
way, appeals to innate psychological machinery explain why humans universally share the 
ability to learn some language or other, but it does not explain why anyone speaks the 
particular languages she speaks, rather than others.12 
 
Sripada and Stich provide a high-level model of the core psychological mechanisms 
comprising an individual’s norm system.13 That model depicts a key distinction between 
those mechanisms responsible for the identification and acquisition of local norms, on one 
hand, and the performance of norms that have been acquired, on the other. Mechanisms on 
both sides of this divide are likely to have aspects that are purely cognitive and 
representational, as well as other aspects that are more affective and motivational. And while 
motivational features include obvious and powerful passions of righteous anger and 
contemptuous disgust, they also include more subtle mechanisms. For instance, motivational 
capacities within the acquisition subsystem may influence attention, shaping what we find 
interesting, salient, and relevant in the behavior and interactions of other people. Even 
children do not need to be cajoled to notice social rules, and nor are they passive learners 
that have to be actively or explicitly taught them. Those as young as three years old appear 
motivated to attend to cues indicating that a behavior is normative, and to draw inferences 
about the rule that is governing it.14 
 
But the affective and motivational aspects involved in following and enforcing norms are 
particularly important for our purposes, largely because they give acquired social rules their 
distinctive normative motivational force, or normative force for short. Our Minimal Account 
incorporates the claims that this normative force is (1) intrinsic, as opposed to instrumental, 
that it is (2) two-pronged—both self- and other-oriented—and that it (3) can be quite strong. 
More fully, when an individual genuinely acquires a norm, rather than merely becoming 
aware of or simply cognitively grasping a social rule, the rule is represented in the database of 
her norm system, and thereby inherits the motivational features associated with the 
performance of norms. Thus, to fully acquire a norm is to develop an intrinsic motivation to 
perform it, rather than following or enforcing it out of instrumental motivation to avoid 
sanctions or attain rewards.15 And normative motivation in this sense is not just non-
instrumental, but also two-pronged: a person who has acquired a norm is thereby motivated 
to obey simply because it is “the right thing to do”, but she is also motivated to enforce the 
norm on others, punishing those who violate it, and often forming longer-standing reactive 
attitudes toward transgressors. This is not to say that a person’s behavior is always in accord 
with the norm, or that she actually enacts the punishments or rewards she deems appropriate, 
but merely that this piece of her psychology generates an impulse to do so, which may be 
overriden. Intrinsic motivation is not irresistible motivation, and both of these types of 
normative motivations, like any others, can be suppressed or superseded by other, more 
powerful motivations. That said, the force of compliance and punishment motivations can 
be, and often is, quite powerful, sometimes overriding self-interested goals, leading to 
examples of sacrifice, commitment to a group or cause, and in extreme cases even 
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martyrdom.16 Aside from strength, the quality of normative motivation can differ along other 
dimensions as well, some of which have to do with details of situations to which a norm 
might apply, some having to do with the norm itself, and some perhaps with which emotion 
the norm draws on, for instance anger, disgust, guilt, shame, outrage, spite, etc.17 
 
Appeal to the norm system, and the normative force it confers on acquired norms, surely 
will not explain every instance of cooperation or collective action, of people acting in 
accordance with social rules, or of people sanctioning those who disobey them. One person 
may follow a social rule out of an instrumental desire to avoid the punishments that come 
from violating it, while another person may follow the same rule for its own sake, regardless 
of the instrumental, practical value of doing so. But we maintain that this Minimal Account 
of normative psychology, and the research on which it draws, provides indispensible 
explanatory purchase in understanding how individuals dole out social rewards and 
punishments and how they respond to the rewards and punishments doled out by others. It 
also thus fits into a larger picture about the group level characteristics of norms, and factors 
that influence how those change over time. We turn to this next.18 
 
Norm Psychology, Cultural Evolution, and Social Change 
 
To clarify how this Minimal Account might contribute to a broader picture of social 
change, we begin by showing how the norm system helps bind individuals to groups, getting 
them in sync with the social arrangements that structure life within any given group. The 
Minimal Account appeals to social learning to explain how an individual comes to have the 
particular norms represented in her norm system, suggesting that, as in the case of language, 
the acquisition mechanism of an individual’s norm system intuitively and automatically 
“soaks up” norms from her social environment.19 The plausibility of this claim comes from 
the commonalities in the developmental trajectory of normative capacities that appear to 
hold across cultures, as well as from patterns in the distribution of particular norms 
throughout populations. Like languages, norms exhibit common patterns of within-group 
similarity and between-group difference.20 
 
The Minimal Account thus depicts human normative psychology as “expecting” certain 
kinds of cues and regularities in an individual’s social world, from which it will be able to 
glean information about the particular norms that prevail locally. These cues manifest in 
other people and their interactions with each other, as well as with the individual herself, and 
the most salient behaviors will be those group-level regularities stabilized by reward and 
punishment. These pockets of the social world provide information about what kinds of 
actions are forbidden, permissible, and required, and, in the episodes of social learning that 
fix on them, the acquisition machinery of a person’s norm system makes (perhaps innately 
constrained) inferences about what the rule is that governs the observed interaction (as well, 
perhaps, as what follows from that rule).21 When she acquires those norms, she becomes 
attuned to her culture and its social arrangements, her own normative sensibility harmonizes 
with the general normative framework of the group of which she is a member, with perhaps 
some fine-grained calibration determined by the particular set of social roles she occupies in 
it.  Due to the normative force exerted by the norms she has acquired, she not only typically 
acts in accordance with them, but typically enforces them as well. Thus, by obeying rules and 
punishing transgressors, she makes her individual contribution to the stability of the 
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collective, supporting the durable structure of the often long-standing social arrangements of 
her culture. 
 
Or so it might go in a “perfect” world. On the highly idealized picture just described, the 
norm system would successfully bind individuals to their groups, but seamlessly. The 
(somewhat unsettling?) vision just sketched suggests individuals who are perfect learners 
getting totally enculturated into a society, flawlessly performing its norms, making them (the 
individuals) pristine models for the next wave of norm learners, and turning them (the 
individuals again) into impeccable members of a society that is almost completely static, and 
whose norms thus remain, but for the occasional exogenous perturbation, largely unchanged 
as they are passed from one generation of individuals to the next. The reality is of course 
(happily?) messier, but this picture, like any good idealization, gets some key things right. 
Many group-level regularities are far from ephemeral; social arrangements and the 
interconnected clusters of norms that govern them can be quite stable over time, even 
doggedly resistant to change. Moreover, modeling work in evolutionary game theory strongly 
suggests that one of the most important stabilizing factors is punishment.22 Via the kind of 
feedback loops just described, when the members of a group enforce norms and punish 
transgressors, the aggregated effect can render interconnected clusters of norms 
endogenously stable. Situations that fit this description are in equilibrium, or in an 
evolutionarily stable state, and the mechanisms that keep them in homeostatis also make 
them robust in the face of a range of external influences—including deliberate attempts to 
change them.23 
 
Two points will allow us to begin complicating this picture. First, as noted above, part of 
the messiness of the actual world is that there is cultural variation in norms, social 
arrangements, and group-level behavioral regularities. The norms and arrangements that 
organize one group can differ dramatically from the norms and arrangements that organize 
another group, and yet both can be endogenously stable. A second way in which reality 
departs from the idealized picture is that the norms and social arrangements of groups do, in 
fact, change over time, shifting from one stable state to another. Together these points show 
that there is more than one way to be stable (some of which are more adaptive, collectively 
efficient and cooperative, some of which are less so). Stability is a property that can be 
realized by many different configurations of norms; there are multiple stable equilibria, and 
punishment and the operation of human normative psychology can in principle stabilize any 
of them. And since there are so many ways to be stable, appeal to norms, punishment, and 
the operation of human normative psychology alone will be inadequate to fully explain either 
variation or change. While it will be a key, perhaps necessary, factor in any viable explanation, 
the Minimal Account can’t by itself explain why those stable configuration of norms that 
have actually been realized have actually been realized, while other possible stable 
configurations have not. Nor can it fully explain, by itself, the fact that norms and social 
arrangements change over time, or how. This requires further resources.24 
 
We maintain, however, that theories of cultural evolution in general can deliver these 
goods. This shouldn’t be controversial; “evolution” means “change,” and so theories of 
cultural evolution are theories of cultural change.25 In general, such theories use the concepts 
and models of biological evolution and evolutionary game theory to understand changes in 
the frequencies and distribution of cultural variants, where cultural variants are understood as 
behavior-affecting bits of information that are acquired socially.26 Variants are typically 
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different kinds of socially transmitted ideas, values, beliefs, preferences, skills, habits, norms, 
etc. These are subject to competition in the face of cultural selective pressures of differing 
strengths and from assorted origins. Cultural variants are understood to have varying levels 
of cultural fitness depending on how likely they are to be copied and transmitted to others, and 
thus spread across populations and between generations.27 When quantified, these properties 
can be represented in the models, which are used to calculate the changes in the frequencies 
of cultural variants that will occur under various conditions. This literature is thriving and 
continues to grow, but for now we will briefly mention a few representative and important 
ways that the psychological features of individuals, including features of their norm systems, 
can influence the transmission and spread of cultural variants. Since norms are cultural 
variants themselves, these psychological features are relevant for attempting to influence 
social change and contribute to the evolution of social arrangements. 
 
Transmission and Learning Heuristics 
 
Unlike in our idealized story, humans are not perfect learners, and cultural transmission 
is reliable but not extremely so, and it does not always lend itself to precise, high-fidelity 
copying. This produces noise and variation, though some of this is counterbalanced by the 
fact that humans are not equal opportunities learners. Rather, social learning capacities, 
including those responsible for the acquisition of norms, are guided by a number of 
transmission and learning heuristics. When added to humans’ hypertrophied (compared to 
other social animals) tendency to imitate each other, these heuristics are features that 
facilitate a groups’ collective ability to more effectively and efficiently produce adaptive 
cultural variants. These heuristics go some way in “correcting” for the effects of noisy 
transmission or sloppy individual learning.28 For example, a prestige heuristic makes us more 
likely to adopt norms and other cultural variants from those with the greatest success and 
status within our group, or within some subculture or reference group with which we are 
concerned.29 Similarly, a conformity bias makes us more likely to imitate the most common 
behaviors, and, in the case of norms, acquire those performed by most of our peers, or 
aspirational peers in the in-group we wish to join.30 Together, these exert systematic 
influence on how the frequencies of norms in a population can change over time. It is worth 
noting that conformity and prestige heuristics give norms and other cultural variants a 
cultural fitness boost independently of the content of those variants, and independently of 
whether or not the norms are just, fair, utility maximizing, etc. Intuitively, the idea is that 
messengers matter, and these heuristics exert an influence on the spread of norms based 
solely on who performs them. Nevertheless, they still directly affect how norms are 
transmitted, influencing which are more likely to be copied and acquired by other members 
of the population. 
 
Epidemiology-Inspired Psychological Stickiness 
 
Another psychological factor that can influence the transmission and cultural fitness of 
norms—and one that also responds in part to features other than the content of the variants 
in question—is what we will call psychological stickiness. This is the degree to which a variant 
easily “meshes” with a variety of features of cognitive machinery other than capacities 
dedicated specifically to social learning. The general epidemiological approach to culture has 
been pioneered and developed by, and fruitfully applied to the study of religion.31 The idea 
can be extended to norms as well: to the extent that a norm is salient, easy to identify, and 
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easy to remember, it will also be more easily transmitted to others.32 Moreover, a norm might 
engage psychological mechanisms in addition to those core components of the norm system, 
and in doing so it may get a further fitness boost. Other psychological mechanisms that have 
been shown to boost the cultural fitness of a norm include particular emotions, such as 
disgust33, narrative capacities, and the way a norm is embedded in a recognizable kind of plot 
or narrative34, close association with attention-grabbing, button-pushing supernormal 
stimuli35, or really anything else that increases the norm’s salience, ease of comprehension, 
retention, and transmission by making it attractive and intuitive to some piece of our 
psychological repertoire. Indeed, meshing with the norms that an individual has already 
acquired could itself make a new candidate norm psychologically stickier for that person, and 
if other individuals in the group are similarly normatively attuned, the new candidate norm 
will be stickier throughout the population, thereby receiving a fitness boost. In this way, 
norms influence the selective environment for other norms.36 
 
Ancient Sociality and Tribal Sociality 
 
While transmission and learning heuristics and psychological stickiness are general 
factors that can affect the spread of any kind of cultural variant, recent research suggests an 
important division between two broad families of psychological systems humans have for 
navigating different kinds of social exchanges. In virtue of this, these systems are more 
directly relevant to norms and normative behavior, but in different and important ways. The 
idea is that human capacities for interacting with each other have two distinct strata, and 
while both help facilitate cooperation and coordination, each has been differently shaped by 
its own distinct evolutionary history, and those differences remain visible in the ways each 
influences social interaction today. The ancient social instincts37 are those that we share with 
many other social animals, which are responsible for our interactions with family and 
friends—conspecifics with whom one shares blood relations or regular patterns of 
interaction. These more ancient capacities operate according to principles associated with kin 
selection and (often reputation-based) reciprocal altruistic solutions to cooperative dilemmas. 
This complex of psychological traits also includes the elements of our status psychology that 
are based on dominance. 
 
Tribal social instincts, by contrast, are evolutionarily recent and uniquely human. As their 
name suggests, they are responsible for our interactions with members of tribal-sized groups, 
whose size far outstrips that of a circle of family members, friends and acquaintances (even 
acquaintances merely by reputation). These include many features of human normative 
psychology, as described above, but other components as well. One such is a set of 
capacities related to monitoring tribal membership. A mark of these is a heightened 
sensitivities to tribal boundaries, or to the symbolic markings that people use to signal what 
groups they belong to, as well as what station or roles they occupy within those groups, and 
thus what norms and beliefs they have likely acquired. These capacities also have 
motivational features, typically shaping differences in the way individuals behave toward 
ingroup and outgroup members.38 Indeed, there has been a great deal of work recently 
exploring how ingroup favoritism and outgroup bias manifest, especially with respect to 
other aspects of social instincts and cooperation. Some of it suggests these heuristics emerge 
rather early in development, driving noticeable differences in norm enforcement and 
reputation management.39 In a series of papers, Carsten De Dreu and colleagues have shown 
that this kind of tribalism runs deep, and that the effects of oxytocin on social interactions 
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bifurcate along ingroup and outgroup lines along a number of different dimensions, 
including empathy, conformity, and cooperative and competitive tendencies.40 
 
Another aspect of our tribal psychology relevant to social change and the transmission of 
norms is the human disposition to give deference based on prestige, rather than just physical 
dominance.41 This can manifest in many behavioral ways associated with status and status-
related behavior, which includes, as mentioned above, differentially imitating highly 
prestigious individuals.42  
 
Finally, tribal social instincts are thought to include a suite of uniquely human emotions 
that evolved in tandem with our normative, tribal membership, and prestige capacities. 
Examples of emotions that have been hypothesized to fit this description these include 
empathy, which allows us to share feelings and cognitive states with others, shame and guilt, 
which can be seen to function as internalized enforcement mechanisms that make a person 
more likely to obey norms she has acquired, and loyalty and pride, which can emotionally 
bind one to her tribe. Alternatively, Kelly argues that disgust, an emotion that is uniquely 
human but relatively ancient and not initially social, nevertheless came to play several roles in 
our more modern tribal social psychology, including producing stigmatizing, dehumanizing 
aversion towards the members, norms, and values of particularly loathed outgroups.43 
 
An important claim here is that, like the newer emotions, and the addition of prestige to 
our status psychology, neither the human normative capacity nor the sensitivities to group 
membership and tribal boundaries are merely refinements to, or elaborations of, the ancient 
social instincts we share with other animals. They are a new thing under the sun. One 
happier result of this is that humans can cooperate with each other in many different ways, 
on a number of different scales. Ancient and tribal instincts provide different tricks to 
identify others in the group as likely cooperators and, more importantly, to detect and 
sanction defectors.44 It has been posited that together these can collectively act as a ‘moral 
hidden hand,’ or a source of pro-social behavior and psychological stickiness that influences 
the spread and evolution of norms. Recall that on its own punishment can stabilize any 
norm: the useful and the pointless alike, as well as the just and unfair, the cruel and the kind. 
The moral hidden hand, however, can act as one of the pressures that drive social change 
towards the better—or at least the more pro-social—by giving a cultural fitness boost to 
norms that lead individuals to act for the good of the group, paying personal costs for the 
sake of others. Thus, norms that activate our feelings of empathy, our sense of fairness, or 
our aversion to gratuitous harm receive a transmission advantage over those that do not. 
This, in turn, acts as a gentle but persistent selection pressure favoring more equitable and 
compassionate social arrangements over the long run, because the norms that prescribe such 
arrangements are more likely to ‘mesh’ well with the range of human cooperative instincts.45 
 
A less happy but equally interesting upshot is that these two sets of instincts can also be 
at odds with each other, and the resulting struggle can manifest both within individuals, and, 
collectively, at the level of groups. In other words “These new tribal social instincts were 
superimposed onto human psychology without eliminating ancient ones favoring friends and 
kin. This resulted in an inherent conflict built into human social life.”46 
 
Finally, a controversial but compelling hypothesis posits that another distinct and 
important process driving the cultural evolution norms and social change is cultural group 
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selection.47 Darwin himself famously endorsed the basic idea: “A tribe including many 
members who, from possessing in a high degree the spirit of patriotism, fidelity, obedience, 
courage, and sympathy, were always ready to aid one another, and to sacrifice themselves for 
the common good, would be victorious over most other tribes; and this would be natural 
selection.”48 Correctly understood, this is a macro form of cultural evolution, and concerns 
competition and cultural selection between different clusters of norms, social arrangements 
and other cultural variants. When one ‘tribe’ – a group of people bound together by shared 
norms, values and other cultural institutions – competes with another, the tribe equipped 
with more efficient, effective, and advantageous cluster of variants will typically win, and its 
technology, norms, and social arrangements will spread at the expense of the defeated 
tribe’s.49 
 
IV. The Social Expectations Account Meets The Cognitive Evolutionary Approach: 
Two Ways of Putting the “Social” in Social Norms 
 
Both Bicchieri’s account and the cognitive evolutionary account distinguish normative 
behavior from merely normal behavior, and both accept a common broad notion of what a 
norm is, namely, a rule of behavior that has both individual and group level properties.50 
Moreover, while group- or population-level regularities are central to each account, both 
reject the idea that norms are to be accounted for purely at the group or population level. 
Rather, both identify norms by appeal to psychological characteristics of the individuals that 
make up the group, but each does so by appeal to different kinds of psychological structure, 
resulting in different explanations for the stability of the relevant group-level regularities. 
The social expectations account defines norms in terms of what we called the Bicchieri-
cluster: empirical expectations about what others will do, normative expectations about what 
they think should be done, and conditional preferences to comply if others do. The cognitive 
evolutionary account appeals to a suite of systems that includes mechanisms for the social 
learning of practices of enforcement (including rewards), along with the specialized 
psychological mechanisms that make up human norm system, as specified by the Minimal 
Account.  
 
Other than the expected terminological differences (which we suspect are reconcilable), 
the key contrasts between the two views flow from what they have to say about motivation 
and acquisition. On our view, human psychology is equipped with a distinctive, specifically 
normative kind of motivation. This motivation is intrinsic, driving an individual to act in 
accordance with those behavioral rules represented in her norm box for their own sake, 
regardless of instrumental or conditional reasons. On this account, the motivation to comply 
with or enforce an acquired norm is, in the relevant sense, asocial, or independent of social 
reasons. This seems to be in direct contrast to the social expectations account, which defines 
norms in terms of an individual’s social, other-oriented beliefs and preferences. In this way, 
it defines norms in contrast to other behavioral regularities like customs, practices, and 
traditions. This strikes us as an odd feature of the account, since it seems obvious to us, and 
natural to say, that customs, practices and traditions are themselves governed by norms, i.e. by 
culturally acquired, intrinsically motivating, socially enforced, behavior-guiding rules that 
specify how to participate in the relevant activity. 
 
On the cognitive evolutionary account, what makes a social norm social isn’t necessarily 
the expectations or preferences that cause anyone to conform to it or enforce it, but rather 
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the way in which it is acquired by individuals: norms are socially learned from cultural peers 
and parents. This is why we have emphasized the psychological machinery dedicated to 
norm acquisition, and the ways in which the Minimal Accounts shows this machinery to be 
both automatic and intuitive, but also exquisitely sensitive to cues of group membership and 
social status. The cultural transmission and acquisition of norms is of enormous importance, 
especially since, once a norm has been acquired and represented in an individual’s norm 
system, that norm becomes imbued with intrinsic motivations of substantial force. 
 
On the evolutionary cognitive account, the following state of affairs is the paradigm for 
norms and human normativity: social acquisition of a behavioral rule that in turn leads to 
intrinsic motivation to comply and sanction. However, motivation is not compliance, and 
intrinsic motivation is not unconditional compliance. We understand Bicchieri’s temptation 
to cordon off these cases as extreme, to save the hard cases for later, and to dub them 
“moral norms” in order to distinguish them from the “social norms” on which her account 
focuses. There is a large and difficult conversation to have here, but the most pressing 
problem is not that we are without any way to delineate morality from other forms of 
normativity, or to cleanly distinguish moral norms from social norms, conventions, 
prudential rules, or the rest. The problem is that there are too many plausible ways to delineate 
the domain of morality, but no two seem to slice the pie in the same way.51 For instance, 
Bicchieri’s account of social norms places them within a larger taxonomy of behavioral 
phenomena.52 In it, she separates out what she calls customs, legal injunctions, and moral 
rules from what she calls norms (descriptive and social). Her conception of moral norms 
defines them as those wherein compliance is unconditional, not dependent either on social 
expectations or social preferences. She does not say state it in these terms but this seems to 
entail that individuals conform to moral norms because they are intrinsically motivated to do 
so, and also that such intrinsic motivation only accompanies moral norms, that it is a unique 
and essential mark of morality. On our view, this mistakes a feature common to all norms 
represented in a person’s norm system (normative force) for one that is distinctive of 
morality, and only morality. In doing so, it also restricts her account so that it has no 
conceptual resources for explaining the cases that emerge as paradigmatic from the point of 
view of the cognitive evolutionary account, and the fact that culturally acquired intrinsic 
motivations are also conferred all kinds of (intuitively nonmoral) norms, including epistemic 
norms, aesthetic norms, norms of logic, language, religion, etiquette, etc.  
 
That said, on our view, the selective focus of the social expectations account is quite 
understandable and even justifiable from the point of view of the practical aims of providing 
actionable policy advice and diagnosing, measuring and changing many important norms.53 
But what is good for practical purposes is not necessarily what is good from the point of 
view of full theoretical understanding. Bicchieri-norms bracket off what the cognitive 
evolutionary account identifies as the most interesting, central and important aspects of 
human normativity, including the roles they play in generating cooperative behavior and 
collective action, and the psychological adaptations that evolved specifically for negotiating 
social environments in which norms are prevalent. Bicchieri-norms are an important subset 
of norm-related social phenomena at the intersection of individual psychologies and 
collective level regularities, but the idea that Bicchieri-norms count as ‘social norms’ proper, 
or that they make up the core subject matter of the study of norms and normativity in 
general, is quite implausible. 
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Fortunately, we see no reason why Bicchieri-norms cannot be incorporated into a 
theoretical perspective that is much broader in scope, which does address the study of 
norms and normativity in general. In many important cases of normative behavior, 
individuals do conform conditionally, on the basis of instrumental motivations derived from 
social expectations. We see no reason to reject or exclude the accurate and detailed account 




We end on an ecumenical note. The types of resources we have discussed in this paper will 
all eventually contribute to our nascent but growing understanding of norms and social 
change. Perhaps they will also be of use in trying to produce and guide it as well (Bicchieri 
2016, c.f. Wilson 2016, Wilson et al 2014). While we hold that evolutionary thought has a 
foundational role to play in this coming synthesis, we disagree with the claim that “nothing 
about norms and institutions the makes sense except in the light of evolution.”54 On the 
contrary, Christina Bicchieri and her colleagues working on the social expectations account 
have provided a clear, useful, and high-resolution understanding of an important subset of 
social norms and norm-related social phenomena. While we have highlighted the differences 
and limitations of that account, particularly with regard to motivation and acquisition, we 
have also argued that it can ultimately be integrated into the evolutionarily based picture we 
have advocated. Together, they can shed more light on all kinds of norms, and on different 
aspects of the complicated tapestry of human normative psychology, cultural transmission, 
and social change.  
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